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colonies ceased in 1640? "Records of immigration begin with the year 1820" (*ibid.*). A few lines below appears the number from Great Britain in 1815. The discrepancy is due to the fact that British records of emigration to the United States began several years before American federal records of immigration, which commenced in 1820. "Machinery has chiefly diminished the need for skilled labor" (p. 34). "The Jews we have received hitherto have been . . . liable to disease, especially tuberculosis, in the crowded life of our city slums" (p. 51). "Russian and German Jews, who are most prone to become victims of tuberculosis within a short time after landing" (p. 259). "The movement toward the cities, in which the young men played the leading part, leaving the girls at home upon the farms, and diminishing their opportunity for marriage" (p. 111). This is curiously contrary to the facts. The young women have played the leading part in this movement, leaving the men at home upon the farms, and in consequence the opportunity for young women to marry is greater and their marriage rate higher in the country than in the city. "The children of foreign-born are, after a time, reckoned as natives in the censuses" (p. 119). In fact children born in this country of foreign-born parents are always treated by the census as native.

Notwithstanding blemishes of which the foregoing are examples, the book seems to me a valuable summary of the recent history and the present aspects of a great national problem: and with the exception of Mayo-Smith's book the best general discussion of immigration into the United States.

W. F. WILLCOX.

History of the War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States of America. By JAMES HANNAY, D.C.L. (Toronto: Morang and Company. 1905. Pp. xv, 372.)

THIS volume, purporting to be a history of the War of 1812, ought to be entitled a history of the warfare along the Canadian frontier during 1812-1814, so far does it fall short of being a well-ordered and comprehensive account of the military and naval events of those years. Its proportions are distinctly unsatisfactory. The campaigns about New Orleans and Mobile are dismissed with a single page, since they had "no connection with the defence of Canada" (p. 358). Russian mediation, peace negotiations, and the treaty of peace receive altogether less than two pages. On the other hand, nearly ten per cent. of the space is given up to imaginary sketches of scenes and typical soldiers, portraits of properly forgotten American and British worthies, and reproductions of old prints. The maps and plans, which number seventeen, taken as a whole are among the satisfactory features of the work and furnish acceptable elucidations of the text.

In the matter of purpose, method, and style the volume has little to commend it to the general reader, and nothing at all to cause the serious,

judicially-minded student to spend any time upon it. It is strikingly like certain histories of the United States which appeared about the middle of the nineteenth century, when the chief aim was to awaken patriotic emotions and pride, without much regard for historical accuracy or for careful and discriminating distinctions such as mark the later accounts of the period of the Revolution and the War of 1812. Here again the purpose is to stimulate Canadian pride by the recital of the part played by Canadians in the War of 1812; the same old swagger, uncritical denunciation, and exaggerated praise appear once more, making it difficult in this day of thorough scholarship on both sides of the St. Lawrence to deal soberly and courteously with the author and his work.

The accounts of battles and skirmishes, especially when Canadians were participants, are burdened with tedious and pedantic details of troops engaged and losses sustained. In the case of naval battles, armament, and crews, the figures and diagrams are taken almost bodily from the *Naval War of 1812* by Theodore Roosevelt, "the president of the United States, who has written a tolerably honest account of the naval operations of the war" (p. 108). Positive errors and carelessness of statement are not infrequent; reiteration of intemperate criticism is common; cheap facetiousness and crude sarcasm abound. A few illustrations, which might easily be multiplied, will suffice: the people of the United States had an "insane hatred of England" (p. 9); the "impressment of British seamen found on board of American vessels" was a cause of friction (p. 9); General Hull was a "ruthless relic of the Revolution" (p. 63); Lossing "had acquired an audacity in falsification not easy to parallel" (p. 159); Sir George Prevost was a veritable black beast for Canada, a caitiff to whose "malign influence" (p. 84), "weakness, or incompetency" "nearly every disaster which the British suffered during the war is to be attributed" (p. 24); he was "an imbecile commander-in-chief" (p. 132), so "incompetent or traitorous" (p. 314) that the author lets slip no opportunity to indulge his detestation of him. The retreats of the Americans were usually disgraceful and cowardly, a thousand put to flight by ten, while by the British now and then "it was deemed prudent to retreat" (p. 172) in the face of greatly superior forces. Captain Warrington of the *Peacock* "satisfied his thirst for murder by the slaying of seven men" (p. 340) of the British cruiser *Nautilus*. For all lack of restraint the author absolves himself from sin, because he sees "no reason why any American of the present day should feel offended at reflections on the actions of men who lived ninety years ago" (p. vii).

The book is devoid of foot-notes and bibliography "because the official sources of our knowledge of the war are so few in number as to render such references unnecessary" (p. vii). Almost the only approach to the use of source-material, aside from numerous anonymous quotations, is in the reprint in full of the important proclamations of General Hull and General Brock, and the Address of the House of As-

sembly of Upper Canada to the inhabitants of that province. If any three chapters rise above the rest in merit, they are those on "Surrender of Hull's Army", "Operations on the Detroit Frontier", and "Plattsburg". Three others, if a phrase of Dr. Hannay may be borrowed, "can well be left to the reader's contempt" (p. 110): "Causes which led to the War", "War declared by President Madison", and "The Capture of Washington".

KENDRIC CHARLES BABCOCK.

Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. By Captain A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1905. Two vols., pp. xxii, 423; xix, 456.)

THESE volumes, which conclude Captain Mahan's series of works on "The Influence of Sea Power upon History", are intended for the general reader, as well as the specialist, being written in a popular style with the use of no technical nautical terms which are not explained. The author stands in a class by himself, having created his own model. A skilled historical investigator and a skilled seaman, he has brought the two qualifications together with remarkable results; nor can it be properly said that he has exaggerated the influence of sea power upon history, although he has given it such surprising predominance. Certainly he has not exaggerated it in its relations to the War of 1812, for that war was caused by regulations affecting the navigation of the sea and there the principal fighting occurred.

The work opens with an account of the remote causes of the war, dating from a hundred years before the Revolution, and of the immediate causes, which were two: the impressment of American seamen and the restriction of the carrying-trade. All other grievances were subordinate to these and could have been adjusted; but these were fundamental. The British position was defensible only on the ground of necessity brought about by the struggle with France. The American position, on the other hand, was correct, Jefferson and Madison having put the case on sound principles. The country was, unfortunately, divided, and a strong faction deprecated resistance to Great Britain. Captain Mahan quotes Gouverneur Morris (I. 71) as saying in 1794 that the United States ought to have at least twelve ships of the line, and thinks if even this moderate navy had been in existence there might have been no war; but Jefferson's policy of neglect of the navy made his attitude on paper toward Great Britain ludicrous in her eyes. Captain Mahan does justice to Madison's great ability, but insists that he was a "deskman" (p. 106) who seemed never to understand that deeds must lie back of words. He quotes (*ibid.*) a remark of Pompey: "Will you never have done with citing laws and privileges to men who wear swords?" Great Britain came to believe that the United States would argue and threaten but never fight. She fought too late and was unprepared.